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ABSTRACT

A three-person field team devoted four days to gathering data
in Andover, Kansas, after a tornado devastated the Golden Spur
Mobil Home Park on April 26, 1991.
The research focus was to
assess the extent to which the media's reporting of the local
emergency management team's response to the disaster influenced the
team's subsequent decisions.
The researchers functioned as
participant observers in the Emergency Operating Center (EOC),
informally interviewed principal EOC members and media personnel,
and obtained copies of media news stories (television and
newspaper) which reported on the organizational response to the
disaster. An assessment of the observation and interview data as
well as the content analysis of the news stories, suggests that the
EOC team devoted a considerable portion of their time to responding
to the negative press they received centering around two issues:
pre-impact warning and post-impact debris clearance. Some of the
media's news stories sought to engage in blame assignation.
The
EOC members devoted time to developing strategies to control the
media damage and changed some decisions they had made in response
to the media's criticism.
The relevant disaster research
literature is utilized to explain the response of the EOC personnel
and the media.
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THE IMPACT OF MEDIA BLAME ASSIGNATION ON THE EOC RESPONSE TO
DISASTER
A Case study of the Response to the April 26, 1991
Andover (Kansas) Tornado

What would Dorothy have found if she had returned home to the
Golden Spur Mobil Home Park on Friday, April 26, 1991?
depends on the time of day.

The answer

If she had arrived at 6:00 p.m., she

would have found a calm, normal time life style being followed by
the residents.

If she had arrived after 6:39 p.m., she would have

been confronted by the horror of what looked like a reenactment of
the bombing of Hiroshima.

The Event

On Friday,

April

26,

1991,

the work week was ending,

the

community's children and their parents were looking forward to the
weekend.

For the residents of Andover, however, this would NOT be

a normal weekend.
injured,

Thirteen lives would end, 175 others would be

840 individuals would lose their homes,

and $7 million

damage would be sustained by a Kansas community of 4,047 before the
day was over.
The Golden Spur Mobile Home Park is located just east of one
of the main traffic arteries leading into the central business
district of Andover, a suburb of Wichita.

The park had contained

241 mobile homes housing approximately 1,000 people.

The residents

represented a cross-section of the citizens of Andover:
4

newly-

a~d

weds, singles, ,young families, middle-aged couples, retirees,
so forth.

The town's police chief numbered among the residents of

the mobile home
in a

community .

The city government off ices are housed

building approximately one mile north of the park.

The

central business district of the community is located approximately
two miles north of the Golden Spur.
On the evening of Friday, April 26,

some residents of the

Golden Spur were not yet home from work, others had gone out for
dinner or to run errands, many others were at home.
the tornado watch had become a warning.
stations

broadcast this

Unfortunately,

numerous

warning

By 6:00 p.m.,

Local radio and television

for

the

Wichita/Andover

area.

residents did not have their radio or

television turned on when these warnings were being broadcast.
Many people had no idea a tornado was approaching their community.
To make matters worse, the neighborhood "civil defense II siren which
was supposed to sound the warning, apparently did not work when it
was activated.

Furthermore, when a local police officer tried to

give one last warning to the park residents by driving up and down
the streets of the Golden Spur sounding his police car siren just
minutes before impact, thereby risking his own life, many residents
did not know (or did not remember) that such police action during
a storm is a warning to take shelter.
At
tornado

approximately
did

impact

6:39
the

p.m.

Golden

on

Spur

virtually every trailer in the park.
were injured.

Friday,

April

trailer

26,

park

1991,

a

destroying

Thirteen people died,

175

More deaths and injuries had been averted for two
5

reasons.

Firs~,

many residents were not at home.

Second,

betwe~n

200-300 residents had heard the tornado warning and went to the
underground shelter located in the center of the trailer park.
They watched in horror as the tornado crushed their mobile homes.
The Golden Spur Mobile Home park sustained a direct impact from the
unusually large and powerful tornado.

The police chief was in the

shelter watching his own home being destroyed.

He was in constant

radio contact with the police station while the tornado worked its
destruction.

Listening to recordings of his messages to police

headquarters provides a chilling indication of what the victims
were experiencing.

The destruction was so massive and total that

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) certified the Andover
site as a federal disaster area.

Research Goal and Methodology

The Natural Hazards Research and Applications

Information

Center's "Quick-Response Grant" program (University of Colorado)
supports

research which

is

focused

on questions best answered

through gathering data during the immediate post-impact period of
a

disaster event.

Research Group

A three-person field team from the Social

(SRG),

Department of Sociology and Anthropology,

Millersville University of Pennsylvania, was supported by such a
grant when it proceeded to the Andover site within 48 hours of
impact.

The team sought to assess the extent to which media

reporting of the local emergency management agency (LEMA) response
to the event influenced the subsequent LEMA decisions.
6

There is a

disaster

resea~ch

literature that notes the contribution made by

the media in warning the pUblic of an impending disaster and in
disseminating

helpful

Drabek & Stephensen,

recovery
1971,

information

(see,

for

example,

for a discussion of the radio as a

warning source; and Quarantelli, 1980), but less is known about the
role

of

the

media

in

influencing

the

behind-the-scenes

LEMA

decision-making process.
The

research

assistants

director

(students)

(faculty

remained

in

member)
the

and

field

two

for

research

four

days

functioning primarily as participant observers in the temporary
emergency operating center (EOC).

The team

informally interviewed

virtually every member of the EOC team, e.g., the mayor who served
as the emergency response coordinator, a county commissioner, city
council members, various city workers,
forth.

police personnel,

and so

The field team also observed and interviewed several print

and broadcast media personnel who were working on news stories of
the event.

The field team sought to gain an understanding of what

the EOC was attempting to coordinate and how they prioritized their
actions pursuant to meeting the needs and desires of their various
constituencies, e.g., victims, volunteers, city workers, and the
larger pUblic.
The members of the research team easily gained entree to the
EOC.

The

research

director had

spoken with one

of

personnel by telephone prior to leaving for the field.

the

LEMA

This LEMA

official was receptive to our research participation and indicated
that he would serve as our "sponsor."
7

When we arrived in the field

o~r

we asked for

contact and presented our credentials.

personnel invited our complete participation.

The EqC

In fact, we had to

make it clear that we were not there to advise,

but merely to

observe and gather information that could be helpful to others as
they

develop

their

future

participant observers.
we wished.
days

of

disaster

plans.

We

functioned

as

We were free to enter and leave the EOC as

We observed virtually all EOC meetings during the four
our

field

work.

We

completed

interviews, during non-busy periods.

informal,

one-on-one

The principal EOC personnel

were very candid about their situation, i.e., the problems they
were facing in trying to coordinate a response, their perceived
failures, their irritation at the media, and so forth.

They were

very frank during their EOC meetings in discussing the details of
how

they

should

constituencies .

respond

to

the

media

and

various

community

The completeness of our entree became readily

apparent to us during our second and third days in the field when
they were openly discussing how they should react to the media's
blame-fixing--Iocal
criticism

officials

were

coming

in the broadcast and print media

under
for

increasing

allegedly not

adequately warning the Golden Spur residents.
An interview guide was committed to memory by the field team
members prior to entering the field.
open-ended

questions

designed

to

This informal guide contained
obtain

the

respondent's

perspective of what problems they were encountering in responding
to the disaster, how these problems were being addressed, by whom,
and when.

We asked the EOC personnel what they thought they would
8

do differently.. (or similarly)
again.

should they face such a situation

We asked what individuals and what organizations were

involved in the response.

And, we asked them to describe their

perspective on the media's activities in helping or hindering the
response process.
After entering the field and observing EOC activities, the
team realized the limited utility of the interview guide.

We found

it far more useful to just observe every conversation, meeting, and
discussion that we COUld.

We tried to inconspicuously take notes

to help us remember what happened and when it happened.
our

tape

recorders

interviews.

to

dictate

notes

and

to

We used

sometimes

record

Most of our interviews became conversations which

helped us

piece together the decisions made by the different

emergency

organizations.

We

were

trying

to

understand

the

interactive decision-making process of this emergent (EOC) group.
We "interviewed" every member of the EOC team which was comprised
of

personnel

organizations.

from
We

local
also

government
"interviewed"

agencies
leaders

and

volunteer

and workers

in

volunteer organizations which had no direct affiliation with the
EOC, e.g., the Mennonite Disaster Services, and we "interviewed"
personnel from local print and broadcast media organizations.

We

completed a total of 32 "interviews" while in the field.
The

field

team

obtained

copies

of

the

local

newspapers

published during the first month of the post-impact and recovery
periods in order to determine types of stories and the slant of the
stories being published about the EOC's disaster response.
9

While

in the field, the team also video-taped news broadcasts of two of
the local television stations for the same purpose.

Did Media Reporting Influence EOC Decisions?
What We Found Upon Our Arrival.

The field team presented its

credentials to the first local official we met upon entering the
EOC.

After explaining who we were and why we were present, we were

accepted and given access to every activity taking place in the
EOC.

We immediately assumed the role of observer.

interviews when possible.

We conducted

We had telephoned the EOC prior to

leaving for the field in order to facilitate entree.
initial contact shortly after our arrival.

We found our

The EOC personnel

appeared to be pleased to be of help to the research effort that
contributes to helping other communities as they plan for such
events.
The field team found the EOC located in an empty store front
in a small strip-mall adjacent to the destroyed mobile horne park.
The community did not have a written disaster plan.

There is no

full or part-time local emergency preparedness coordinator.

The

mayor emerged during the immediate post-impact period to function
as the coordinator of the city's response to the tornado.

Various

other local elected officials emerged to function as a committee to
assist the mayor.
converged to

Community, church, and volunteer organizations

assist the elected officials

in coordinating the

cleanup.
A temporary EOC was set up in an empty room of the vacant
10

store.

The EOC contained a conference table with enough chairs

around it to seat approximately 15 people.

A felt-tip writing

board was mounted on a wall on which information was written as it
became available, e.g., problems needing attention, names and phone
numbers

of

conference.

key

personnel,

the

mayor's

next

press

A typewriter, telephones, and eventually a television

and a photo-copying machine were installed.
the EOC,

scheduled

Almost everything in

including the store it was housed in, were donated by

local businesses.
EOC security was maintained by the local police department
which numbered five uniformed police officers.

within 36 hours of

impact a security badge system was in place.

No one was allowed

into the EOC area without a security badge.

A communications bus

was positioned directly in front of the store (EOC location).
Red

Cross

Canteen

communications bus.

was

located

in

the

parking

lot

near

A
the

Various additional volunteer organizations,

e.g., ham radio operators club, were working out of empty stores or
vehicles in the mall parking lot.
The destroyed trailer park was across the street from the mall
in which the EOC was located.

Anyone from the EOC wishing to visit

the disaster site could simply walk to it within a few minutes.
The field team made numerous such trips.

The National Guard was

onsite to prevent anyone who did not have a security badge from
entering the trailer park.

They were called to Andover to "prevent

looting and to assist in traffic control."

There was a problem

with converging sightseers clogging the roads.
11

Search and rescue

activities

wer~

slowed due to this convergence.

Residents who we:r;e

not home during impact as well as the relatives of victims or
survivors found it difficult to reach the site.

And, volunteers

who were trying to assist sorting the debris for valuables were
also hindered by the convergence.

The trucks carrying the bull-

dozed debris had a difficult time getting to and from the site.
Emergent Issues Reported in the Media
Debris Clearance.

When we first arrived, the EOC personnel

were in the process of dividing into two separate camps of diverse
opinion in response to an emerging issue.
the trailer park begin?

When should clearance of

It had been less than 48 hours since

impact, but there were those who wanted to give the go-ahead to the
city engineer, his crew, and the crews donated by area businesses,
to initiate the clearance of the debris.

The primary reason given

for

possible

starting

the

cleanup

as

soon

as

was

that

the

businesses which donated the bulldozer crews and equipment would
not be able to do without them indefinitely.

Their withdrawal was

anticipated within days, especially if they were sitting idle.

A

second reason, provided by the owner of the mobile home park, was
that the victims would not be able to obtain, install, and move
into new mobile homes in the park until the park was cleared of the
debris from the storm.

Hence, the park owner and those personnel

charged with completing the clearance of the debris, lobbied the
EOC to keep the survivors out of the park so that the debris
clearance could be completed immediately.
Those

opposing

immediate

action
12

were

concerned

that

the

survivors

need~d

much more time to locate valuables that were among

the ruins, e.g., family photos and mementos.
made

frequent

visits

to

the

trailer

park

Members of this camp
to

speak

surviving residents who were combing through the debris.

with

the

These EOC

officials would return to relate the pleas and frustrations these
citizens expressed in asking for "a couple more days" to find their
irreplaceable keepsakes.

Most local print and broadcast media

focused on reporting the extent of damage, the death and injuries,
the sources of help for victims, the types of aid needed, where to
send it,

and the locations for volunteers to meet to help victims.

One local television station,
focused on blame-fixing.

however,

and one local newspaper

[Blame assignation occurs more commonly

after technological disasters, but has been known to occur after
natural

disasters

such

as

tornadoes

(Chandessers,

1966).]

A

reporter from each of these repeatedly interviewed victims who were
very vocal about their frustration with the city's initial decision
to not allow them to return to their damaged or destroyed home to
obtain valuables and with the city's initial announcement that
debris clearance would begin shortly--before valuable salvaging
could be

completed.

The

slant

of the

news

stories

of

these

reporters essentially portrayed the EOC as being inconsiderate of
the needs of those they were supposed to serve.

We are not taking

sides here, we are merely attempting to describe the roles assumed
by the principals as we have assessed the situation in the field.
The

argument

could

certainly

be

reporters were doing the victims a
13

made

that

the

blame-fixing

service by taking up their

cause.

The p()int being made here is that we are not passirlg

jUdgment on who may be more right or more wrong, we are noting that
a conflict existed which pit the EOC against some in the media.
This conflict consumed a lot of time from the EOC personnel as they
planned how to respond to the mounting criticism where it appeared.
While the EOC was attempting to coordinate the community's response
to the disaster,

it devoted much time to determining what

considered the best response to this criticism.

it

The debate over

when to complete the debris clearance continued throughout our four
days in the field.

Deadlines for victims to finish their salvage

efforts were set daily, then pushed back as a result of complaints
by the victims and the media's portrayal of such complaints.

The

clearance was finally set to begin the day the field team was
leaving town.
The Mennonite Disaster Services (MDS) also contributed to the
continual EOC "mind changing."

Early each morning the MDS would

send a large crew to the trailer park to sift through the debris
\

for victims who were not present.

The MDS operated separately from

the EOC and resisted virtually all efforts to bring them within the
coordination sphere of the EOC.

The MDS essentially ignored any

decision by the EOC when it would indicate that search activities
would be discontinued to begin clearing the park.
media's
became

criticism and the MDS's
impossible to

realized any

begin

Between the

ignoring of EOC decisions,

clearing the

"strong arm tactics"

to

park.

EOC

stop the MDS

it

personnel
would only

further exacerbate the EOC's emerging pUblic relations problems.
14

The field ,team concluded that it was obvious that the media's
involvement had a definite impact on the decision making of the EOC
personnel.

It influenced how the EOC utilized its time.

It also

influenced the EOC's decision as to when to begin the final phase
of the debris clearance.

Virtually every EOC decision increasingly

became hostage to the desire to limit "media damage" as the need to
consider

how

the media

might

perceive

(or misperceive)

their

actions was of increasingly greater concern to them with each
negative press story.

Warnings.

We also discovered, shortly after our arrival, that

both EOC camps were bristling at the emerging media blame-fixing
reports which were suggesting that the city did not do an adequate
job

warning

the

impending impact.

trailer

park

residents

about

the

tornado's

Even though there was a difference of opinion

between the two camps in the EOC over when to initiate debris
clearance, there was total unanimity of resentment toward those in
the

media

who

sought

to

criticize

their

pre-impact

efforts.

Virtually all of the EOC personnel had no sleep in the 48 hours
since impact.

They felt that they had been totally devoted to

doing the best job they could in coordinating the response to
facilitate the community's restoration to normal time activity.

In

private conversations with the research team, some EOC personnel
suggested that maybe everything they had done before, as well as
since, impact may not have been perfect, but "we are only human
. . . had no prior experience, no written (disaster) plan, no prior
training, and are doing the best we can making this up as we go
15

along."

They j,ndicated that they were in frequent contact with.a

neighboring community that had recently experienced an emergency
event and had taken steps to be better prepared should they be a
target of a disaster again.

The Andover EOC personnel were using

their neighboring community's emergency coordinators as consultants
in developing their own emergent response.

Nevertheless, media

attention continued to focus on why the city, allegedly, did not
take adequate steps to warn the residents prior to impact.
The first

such issue centered on criticism of the police

department's attempt to warn the mobile home residents by sending
a patrol car through the park neighborhoods sounding its siren.
The city stated that this procedure is standard operating procedure
during

a

previously

tornado warning,
been

educated

television reports.

a

procedure that

to

recognize

the

through

community had
newspaper

and

In other words, the citizens should have known

what the siren meant.

From the city's perspective, they risked the

life of an officer to give the warning just minutes before impact.
From the point of view of those who criticized the police effort,
it was a meaningless effort.

In the view of one survivor, "why not

at least use a bull horn to warn those who were walking on the
street?"
The EOC decided to release a video tape they had of the police
officer's effort.

In response to the alledged beating of Rodney

King by Los Angeles police officers, Andover had mounted a video
camera on each police cruiser just weeks before the tornado struck
their community.

City officials stated that these cameras were to
16

be used to recprd arrests in order to provide evidence for drunk
driving offenses and to protect the police officer from false
charges of police brutality.
the

alarm

By chance, the officer who sounded

in the mobile home park,

had

the video

camera

on,

inadvertently recording his attempt to warn the park residents.
The EOC decided to call a press conference in order to play the
video tape for the press as a strategy for reducing the criticism.
Many in the media saw it differently, however; they recoiled when
they watched the police officer drive past a
walking

her

dog--apparently

impending disaster.

unaware

or

resident who was

unconcerned

about

the

They thought the officer should have stopped

to inform the resident of what the siren meant and tell her to seek
shelter.

It was seen as quite possible that she could have had

time to get to the shelter if he had stopped.

It is also quite

possible that a) she would have decided to not go to the shelter,
b) she may not have had enough time anyway, and/or c) the police
officer may have run out of time to save himself . . . and died.
A second criticism of the city I s alleged lack of adequate preimpact warning emerged.
whether or not

the

A debate raged around the question as to

community

(civil

defense

actually activated during the pre-impact period.
EOC

personnel

period.

continued the

debate

style)

siren was

The media and the

throughout

the

post-impact

Many residents were quoted in the press as stating that

they did not hear a siren, some said that they had.
of the siren found it to be non-functional.

An examination

EOC personnel stated

that it had been inspected recently and had been found to have been
17

in good working. order.

The firm that had been employed to maintain

the siren was quoted as indicating that the siren had been left
unrepaired until funds could be found to purchase the expensive
parts it needed.
While the EOC was busy responding to the post-impact needs of
the trailer park, it was also spending a fair amount of time trying
to both respond to the media's

investigation into the siren's

status and to attempt to limit the ill-will being generated in the
community by the media' s
issue.

investigative reporting of this third

To counter the increasing negative feelings being generated

in the community by the siren issue,

the EOC decided to hold a

press conference at which they would answer questions and release
information which, they felt, would refute the perception that the
city had been irresponsible.
The field team concluded that it was obvious that the media's
reporting had an obvious impact on the actions taken by the EOC in
response to each of the three issues which emerged in the media
during the post-impact immediate recovery period.

We want to

clearly repeat the we are not chastising either the media or the
EOC for actions taken.

Our task was to determine if the decisions

made by the EOC personnel were influenced by the reporting in the
media

during

the

immediate

recovery

period.

As

participant

observers who engaged in informal interviewing we sought to gather
qualitative

data

which

would

enable

occurring pursuant to our research goal.

us

to

discern

what

was

The short answer to the

question (Did the media's reporting influence the disaster response
18

decisions made.by the emergency personnel in the aftermath of the
Andover tornado?) is: Yes!

Content of Media's Reporting

While the EOC was stung by the negative media reports,

we

found most of the print and broadcast media reporting to have been
either supportive of their efforts or at least neutral.
the reporting dealt with damage estimates,

Most of

death tolls,

interest stories about survivors, and so forth.

human

The media was a

real asset as the primary or only source of disaster information
for the community

(as observed,

for example,

by Wenger,

1980--

while Wenger's focus was quite different, the point is applicable
here).

It was essentially one reporter from one of the television

stations and one reporter from one of the newspapers that focused
on the critical issues.
supportive

of

the

EOC,

Yet,
much

while most of the reporting was
time

responding to those minority of
negative press.

and

effort were

devoted

to

instances where they received

Some EOC personnel became increasingly antagonist

toward anyone from the offending television station or newspaper
company.

They also became increasingly distrustful of the media

generally.
For

example Table 1,

content

analysis

disaster.

of

print

below,
and

provides

broadcast

the

results

of our

news

reports

on

the

Please note that in the case of both the print and

broadcast media the ratio of negative reporting was less than one
in ten.

Most television news stories (91%) were either positive or
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neutral in

repa~ting

on disaster events and most newspaper accounts

(93%) were also either neutral or supportive of the efforts of the
EOC.

TYPE OF REPORTING

TABLE 1:

Media Form
Broadcast
Print
Reporting
supportive
critical

91% (120)
9% ( 12)
100% (132)

93% (141)
7% ( 10)
100% (151)

The reader should note, however, that while the Wichita area
has five television stations, plus cable news channel, the field
team was able to obtain video tapes of television news broadcasts
only

while

we

were

in

the

field.

Furthermore,

these

broadcasts came from only two of the television stations.
possible

that

the

broadcasts

of

the

other

stations

taped
It is
were

substantively different from those we recorded.
On the other hand,

it was possible to obtain copies of the

major local newspaper and the local weekly newspaper for the month
following the date of impact.

Hence, the content analysis of the

print media news stories of the event is more complete than that
for the broadcast media.

We were able to include in our content

analysis those news reports that the EOC found offensive--and to
which their decisions were responsive.

Recovery.

During the weeks that followed the disaster event,

the clearing of the park was subsequently completed.
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Rebuilding

was begun and .. attempts were made to return the community to . a
version of normal time activity.

The media sought new stories and

the victims continued to struggle with what would be, for them, a
long term process of rebuilding their lives.

Those local leaders

who comprised the post-tornado emergent EOC staff began a soul
searching process to assess what should be done to be better
prepared for any future disaster that they hoped would never visit
their community.

Literature Based Analysis , Discussion of the Findings
Researchers have long argued that disaster warnings must be
conceptualized as a social process (Williams, 1956; Mileti, 1975;
Mileti,
1980;

Drabek, and Haas,

Perry,

1985;

1975; Janis & Mann 1977; Quarantelli,

Drabek,

1986).

disaster warning is disbelief"
1969;

Moore,

et al.,

1963;

(Drabek,

Fritz

disaster event was unexpected,

"The initial response to a

&

e.g.,

1986; see also,

Mathewson,

Drabek,

1957).

If the

the case of a rapid onset

disaster agent such as a tornado, and if the level of emergency
preparedness is low, most people tend to continue in their normal
routine

when

first

warned

of

an

impending

disaster,

as

they

disbelieve the warning whether it comes from an authority or not
(Perry,

Lindell,

&

Greene,

1981;

Quarantelli,

1980).

If

the

warning message appears to the listener as vague, their tendency to
disbelieve it is increased (Drabek, 1986 & 1968; Mileti, Drabek, &
Haas, 1975; Perry, et al., 1981; Fritz, 1957).
Several variables appear to

increase the

likelihood of a

warning being taken seriously and appropriately acted upon.
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These

variables

include

the

of

clarity

the

warning

message,

i . e. ,

specificity of the nature of the hazard and what the listener is
directed to do in response to it (Perry, Lindell, & Greene, 1982);
the consistency of the warning message with other warning messages,
i.e., media, weather services, local authorities,

family members

seem to all be giving the same warning message (Demerath,
Fritz,

1957; Mileti,

Drabek,

frequency of the warnings

Haas,

&

(Mileti,

1975;

Drabek,

1975; Fritz,

1957;

1986);

the

1961; Drabek &

Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 1969 & 1986; Perry, Lindell, & Greene, 1981);
the type of authority who is giving the message, e.g., the media is
believed

more

than

the

police

or

fire

personnel,

yet

the

police/fire personnel are believed more than friends or family
(Perry & Greene,

1983; Drabek,

accuracy of past warnings,

1969 & 1986; Mileti,

1975); the

i.e., if they accurately forecast the

disaster agents direction and impact (Mileti, Drabek, & Haas, 1975;
Haas, Cochrane, and Eddy, 1976; Foster, 1980; Drabek, 1986); and
the frequency of the disaster agent, e.g., if tornadoes frequently
strike the area (Drabek, 1986; Anderson, 1969).
During the pre-impact period, an attempt was made to warn the
residents of Andover of the impending tornado I s impact.

First, the

community officials attempted to activate the civil-defense siren
system.

It apparently failed to operate in the normal fashion.

Even if it had, it should be noted that Hodler (1982) studied the
response of the residents of a community to a tornado warning and
found that less than half of the affected residents who heard the
civil defense warning sirens sought a
22

location of safety,

even

though they we,re tested briefly on the first Saturday of each
month.

Dependence on a siren system to move the population to

effectively respond to the warning of

an

impending

impact

is

thereby rendered suspect as an effective means of warning the
population.
The community utilized two additional medium to warn the
residents.

First,

tornado watch,

radio and television stations broadcast the

then the warning for the Wichita-Andover area.

Because a tornado is a rapid-onset disaster agent, it is difficult
to expect the warning to provide sufficient time for the total
population to complete the social process of digesting, confirming,
and acting upon the warning prior to impact.

As noted above, the

media has been found in the literature to be the most believed
source of disaster warning information and Wenger,
Faupel

(1980)

found

that

most

citizens

information about disasters from the media.

tend

to

James,

obtain

and

their

Furthermore, not all

residents of any community have a radio or television turned on
when such warnings are being given.

This appeared to be the case

for many Andover residents.

there remain the

And,

issues of

clarity, consistency, frequency, previous accuracy, and frequency
of tornadoes in the area.

The broadcast messages were clear to the

extent that they indicated the nature of the threat, a tornado, and
the

response

the

listener was

appropriate shelter.

being directed to

follow,

seek

As is the nature of the state of the art of

tornado forcasting, the path of the tornado and sUbsequent impact
area is vague enough to enable many listeners to assume that they
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will not be th~ actual target.

Previous experience, even in ~n

area prone to tornadoes, tends to reinforce this perception of the
validity of the warning to many listeners.

And, the opportunity to

broadcast frequent warnings is reduced by the rapid-onset of a
tornado, unlike the slow-onset generated opportunities a hurriance
provides for giving frequent warnings not only in the broadcast,
but also the print media.
The remaining attempt to warn the area was the attempt by the
Andover Police Department to alert the residents of the Golden Spur
Mobile Home Park by sending an officer to quickly drive up and down
the streets of the mobile home park with his siren activated as a
warning.

When it became apparent to the city that this area was in

the direct path of the tornado, there were minutes to act.

The

patrol car was dispatched to the park, the officer had less than 10
minutes to drive through the park and then return,

at

speeds

exceeding 80 miles per hour, to the station house shelter which was
approximately

two

miles

from

the

park.

If

the

officer

attempted to go door to door to warn residents he would,
likelihood, have become a victim of the storm himself.

had

in all

Post-storm

criticism which suggested that the officer could have used a bull
horn to at least warn those who were milling outside their homes,
as well as the criticism which suggests that the residents "had
only themselves to blame since they did not heed the warnings,"
assume the clarity of vision that comes with hindsight.

The

literature, as noted above, has observed the tendency for those who
even hear the warning to disregard it, unless the message is very
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clear, frequently given in a consistent message over time, which is
not undermined by previous experience where the warnings appeared,
to the listener, to be unnecessary.
community

is one which

tornadoes,

the

In the Andover experience, the

is generally exposed to the threat

appropriate

authorties

were

sounding

(media and police personnel), and the message was clear.

the

of

alarm

In fact,

we can account for the response of at least 388, perhaps 488 of the
Golden Spur Mobile Home Park residents.

Between 200 and 300 of

them heeded the warning and went to the shelter in the park.
were safe.

Thirteen people died and 175 were injured.

They

Presumably

these 188 individuals either did not hear the warnings or did not
heed them.

We do not know the where abouts of the remaining

residents, between 512 and 612 individuals.

Most, if not all of

them, were apparently not home at the time.

Some of them heeded

the warning and left for safer locations out of the area, many had
not returned from work yet, others had gone out for the evening.
Apparently,
unharmed.

few

stayed

in their mobile homes

and walked

away

Hence, it appears that more than half of the residents

that we can account for,

did respond to the warning.

This is

better than what Hodler (1982, discussed previously) observed in
response to the warning of an impending tornado's impact in a case
study

of

another

community.

It appears,

therefore,

that the

Andover citizens behavior was very typical of what tends to occur
in

response

to

disaster warnings.

It

also

appears

that

the

response of the relevant community organizations, e.g., the media
and local government, was very typical in their attempts to warn
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the residents.

Using civil-defense sirens, media warnings,

and

police warnings are not unusual ways to attempt to allert the
citizenry and move them to act on behalf of their own safety.
If the Andover experience is not atypical of the research
literature, then why did we observe the blame assignation process
among local residents as reflected in the media?

Drabek (1968)

notes

some disaster

that

events.

searches

for

"the guilty"

do

follow

Chandessais (1966) discovered that citizens do sometimes

use the town administration as the scapegoat during the aftermath
of a tornado.

Singer (1982), similarly, observed a tendency to

direct blame toward civic officials.

Wolensky and Miller (1981, as

reported in Drabek, 1986:293) noted "the generalized belief that
formal authorities in local government were [seen as] unresponsive
to the needs of specific citizens.

.

there existed a

between what was expected and what was delivered.
this,

certain constituencies

mobilize."

felt

unprotected

'gap'

In response to
and

' forced'

to

Drabek and Quarantelli (1967, as reported in Drabek,

1986:292) suggest that such blame assignation may "help give the
illusion that corrective action of some sort is being taken."
While blame assignation is more likely to occur in conjunction with
a technological disaster than with one that is caused naturally
(Drabek & Quarantelli, 1967), the scapegoating experienced by the
Andover

government

officials

during

the post-impact

and

early

recovery periods was not, therefore, totally unprecedented.
The appropriate question to address presently seems to suggest
itself automatically:

under what circumstances is a
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community

likely to become more effective in responding to such disaster
events?

Beyond those which have

already been

implied

above,

several suggested by the literature will be offered below.

concluding Observations

What would Dorothy have found if she had returned home to
Kansas on that fateful Friday in April 1991?

She would have found

a trailer park totally destroyed by an extremely large and powerful
tornado.

She would have been pleased to find so many survivors

resulting from the 200-300 residents wisely heeding the warning and
evacuating to the underground shelter.

She would have found a

divided, but earnest, EOC trying its best to respond to the events
that

have

befallen

them,

without

a

written

disaster

training to guide them in their decision-making.

plan

or

She would have

found a very well organized, very competent, if very independent,
group

assisting

the

victims

irreplaceable possessions.

in

their

determination

to

find

And Dorothy would have found broadcast

and print media news stories which were often supportive of the
community 's attempts to recover from the tornado,
would

have

response.

found

stories

which

were

critical

yet she also

of

the

town's

These latter stories were of sufficient concern to the

EOC as to influence their decision-making during the immediate
post-impact and early recovery periods.
Since Dorothy knows "there's no place like home," she would be
interested in suggesting how things could possibly be improved in
case another tornado comes to town.
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Therefore,

the field team

offers several

~uggestions which

on~y

are not meant to be critical,

supportive as Andover and other communities seek to continue to
improve the service they give to their pUblic during time of
disaster.
Disaster Plan.

A written disaster plan would assist present

and future individuals who find themselves with the unenviable task
of having to respond to a disaster agent's impact
1986;

Quarantelli,

1984;

& Quarantelli,

Dynes

(see Drabek,
1975;

Dynes,

Quarantelli, & Kreps, 1972 for a discussion of the merits of such
planning).

The process of constructing the written plan would be

of great benefit to the organizations who must respond to such
emergencies.

other communities,

the state emergency management

office, and FEMA would all be sources for guidance in developing
such a plan.
The local government could engage

Communi ty Education Effort.

in an ongoing effort to educate the community about the needs,
problems,
example,

and procedures associated with disaster events.
school

children

could

be

taught

the

For

importance

of

evacuating or seeking shelter when the community and/or police
siren is activated.

Of course, additional warning activities could

be considered to facilitate gaining the awareness of community
members that an emergency is taking place.
Those who are members of the EOC

Disaster Training & Drills.

would

greatly

benefit

by

attending

training

seminars.

training would not only give direction to the individual

Such
role

responsibilities, but should also give some direction in writing
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and updating a .. community's disaster plans.

In addition to being

taught disaster response skills, regular disaster drills would test
the readiness of the individuals and their organizations.

Drills

should benefit the community in assessing the adequacy of their
written disaster plan as well.
While it may not be economically feasible for

EOC Design.

every community to maintain a permanent EOC,

the disaster plan

could designate an emergent EOC structure which should alleviate
some

of

the

trial-and-error

decision

organizational response to a disaster.

making

that

accompanies

Even an EOC that does not

exist until a disaster strikes, needs some written guidelines which
outline what roles need to be fulfilled, what tasks commonly need
to be addressed in what order, and what problems can be expected to
arise during the life cycle of the recovery period.

Of course, any

written plan is only useful if it is actually implemented.
Perhaps the cooperation of

Mutual Assistance Agreements.

organizations such as the Mennonite Disaster Services could be
attained if the community developed and maintained,
their implemented written disaster plan,
during normal time.

a relationship with it

The community and organizations like MDS could

mutually educate each other of their needs,
forth.

as part of

If an emergency develops

procedures,

in the community,

and so

it would,

thereby, be in a better position to respond in concert with the
various organizations.
Developing

a

Relationship with

the Media .

Investigative

reporters may by definition view their role as adversarial.
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It is

arguably good tpat.this is the case at times, since the Golden

Sp~r

Mobile Home Park residents' desire to have more time to reclaim
their property was essentially fulfilled through the role the local
media played on their behalf.

The rebuilding process can be hurt,

however, if local politics and personality clashes interfere with
EOC attempts to respond effectively.
implemented properly,

A good disaster plan, when

could assist those who would perform EOC

functions during emergency time, if it provides for mechanisms for
developing an effective relationship with key personnel in print
and broadcast media during normal time.

The media could become

involved in the planning process and gain an understanding of the
valuable role they can play in assisting the local community as an
information disseminator during time of disaster.

The media can be

a very valuable aid to a community struck by disaster.
information

can

be

disseminated

television, and radio reporters.

with

the

help

Life saving

of

newspaper,

If those who would fulfill EOC

roles during disaster time seek to educate those in the media as to
how they can give valuable assistance to the recovery effort, then
perhaps the emergency coordinators can devote more of their time to
the primary task of responding to the disaster rather than to the
media's criticism.
organizations,

EOC

By developing a working relationship with media
personnel

may

gain

insight

into

the

most

effective approach to involving media personnel as team members who
are

jointly attempting

to

serve the

adversaries.

30

community

rather

than

be
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